Lehigh County Criminal Lawyer

18 Pa. C.S.A. Section 905(b) states that a person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by the conduct of another person for which she is legally accountable. The person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when, acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct, he is made accountable by the law defining the offense or he is an accomplice of the person in the commission of the offense. This comes from Commonwealth v. Bridges of 1977.  A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: 1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission the other person to commit it or he aids or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it, or 2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. This comes from 18 Pa. C.S.A. Section 306(c) and Commonwealth v. Scoggins of 1973. The least degree of collusion between the defendant and another is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as an accomplice. In order to sustain a first degree murder conviction under a theory of accomplice liability, the Commonwealth's evidence must be sufficient to establish that the defendant/accomplice possessed the specific intent to kill. This is from Commonwealth V. Spotz of 1998.  Such a shared criminal intent between the principal and the accomplice may be inferred from the defendants words or conduct, or from attendant circumstances as explained by your Lehigh County criminal lawyer. The following evidence was sufficient and Commonwealth v. Spotz to establish the requisite specific intent to commit first-degree murder: the defendant and his accomplice cooperated together in driving the victim to a secluded area where she was shot. It was the defendant who asked her questions clearly designed to determine how long it would be before her absence would be discovered, and it was the defendant who had begun.  To be an accomplice within the meaning of the statute, a defendant must have knowledge of and participate in the specific crime charged. This comes from the case of Commonwealth v. Hackett from 1993.  

Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 9711, the aggravating circumstance in section 9711(d)(6) does not apply to accomplice where the defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a phony. However, accomplice liability is expressly provided for in section 9711(d)(13) and (14), which relate to killings implicating the controlled substance, drug, device and cosmetic act.  When an accomplice testifies for the Commonwealth at trial, counsel should ask for a "corrupt source" charge to the effect that an accomplice/witness will inculpate others out of a reasonable expectation of leniency. A judge's refusal to so instruct a jury constitutes reversible error, as outlined in Commonwealth v. Watts of 1985.  The basis for accomplice liability is what the courts have called shared criminal intent, as outlined in Commonwealth v. Wright of 1975. The Commonwealth's burden of proof and establishing accomplice liability is the same as required for establishing a conspiracy. The actor and his accomplice share equal criminal responsibility. Thus, a "lookout" is as guilty as those who carried out the crime, as is the driver of the vehicle used to transport the actual participants of the crime. As with conspiracy, mere presence is not sufficient to establish accomplice liability, there must be more significant actions and a substantial step.