Although the merger doctrine articulated in Anderson appears clear, a Lehigh County criminal lawyer must approach research on merger with great caution, reviewing not only the facts underlying the opinion as compared to the facts of the case being defended, but also the reasoning by which the appellate court reached its conclusion in that case, keeping in mind the rule and Anderson. With that caveat, here are a few cases on merger that will be helpful to any Lehigh County criminal attorney.
The terms "greater" and "lesser-included" in merger analysis refer to the logical relationship between the elements of the offenses, not to the grading of the offenses or the punishments imposed. An offense that is more broadly defined is conceptualized as the greater offense, and the offense who's elements are entirely subsumed is conceptualized as the lesser-included offense. Once such a relationship exists, the merger doctrine requires that only one sends be imposed, but it has nothing to say about which sentence that should be. This is from the case of Commonwealth v. Everett, from 1995.
Similarly, a court could impose a sentence for homicide by vehicle while driving under the influence, a third-degree felony with a mandatory minimum sentence of three years, while vacating a separate sentence for involuntary manslaughter, a first degree misdemeanor. Possession of an instrument of crime does not merge with aggravated assault, even if the aggravated assault sentence is enhanced by the possession of the same weapon as the court in Commonwealth v. Brown in 1992 determined. When one act gives rise to a conviction under several subsections of the simple assault statute, only one sentence under one subsection may be imposed. When a criminal act has been committed, broken off, and then resumes, at least two crimes have occurred in sentences may be imposed for each. This is the case of Commonwealth v. Belsar from 1996. In Commonwealth v. Shannon from 1992, the court determined that since the crime of rape includes the crime of indecent assault, a defendant cannot be sentenced on both if they arose from the same criminal episode. Even if the sentence on one count is suspended, the prejudice is such that the sentence must be vacated on the improperly imposed suspended sentence. Separate sentences could not be imposed for violating separate subsections of the voluntary deviant sexual intercourse statute.