Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3104, "Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions under this chapter except evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant where consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissible pursuant to the rules of evidence."
There is a long line of history relating to this law being established. Essentially, a Lehigh County criminal lawyer could potentially portray the victim as promiscuous to
If, however, your lawyer finds that past sexual conduct is still important, an evidentiary hearing will be set by the court after a motion is filed. The court then makes a determination as to the relevance of the information/evidence.
One particular exception, however, is with prior consensual sex. In Commonwealth v. Majorana from 1983, a Supreme Court case, the Appellant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow evidence of consensual intercourse between a co-defendant and the complainant which occurred two hours before the alleged rape, pursuant to the Pennsylvania's Rape Shield Law, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3104. The trial court sentenced appellant to prison after a jury found him guilty of unlawful restraint and criminal conspiracy to commit rape. During the trial, the court refused to allow a codefendant whom the complainant accused of the rape, to introduce evidence of an act of consensual intercourse between him and the complainant said to have occurred some two hours before the alleged rape. The trial court held that the proffered evidence was evidence of "past sexual conduct" which did not raise the issue of consent and thus was barred by Pennsylvania's Rape Shield Law, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3104. The appellant court affirmed, and appellant sought review. The court reversed and remanded the appellate court's order, because the admission of such evidence was not barred. The court held that evidence of intercourse, which showed that it, and not a rape, caused objective signs of intercourse, was relevant. Furthermore, the court held that the trial court erred by not admitting at trial, because the evidence was directly relevant to negate the act with which appellant was charged, and the evidence directly contradicted the act or occurrence at issue, namely, the alleged rape.