Lehigh County Criminal Lawyer

In a question of first impression in Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court has held that computer-generated animation (CGA) may be relevant and admissible as demonstrative evidence in aid of expert testimony.  

There are three basic types of evidence that are admitted into court: (1) testimonial evidence, (2) documentary evidence, and (3) demonstrative evidence. Demonstrative evidence is tendered for the purpose of rendering other evidence more comprehensible to the trier of fact. As in the admission of any other evidence, a trial court may admit demonstrative evidence whose relevance outweighs any potential prejudicial effect. The offering party must authenticate such evidence. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims, Pa. R. Evid. 901(a). Demonstrative evidence may be authenticated by testimony from a witness who has knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be, Pa. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). Demonstrative evidence such as photographs, motion pictures, diagrams, and models have long been permitted to be entered into evidence provided that the demonstrative evidence fairly and accurately represents that which it purports to depict.

The overriding principle, that Bucks County criminal lawyers would know, in determining if any evidence, including demonstrative, should be admitted involves a weighing of the probative value versus prejudicial effect. The trial court must decide first if the evidence is relevant and, if so, whether its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania defines relevant evidence as having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, Pa. R. E. 401. Relevant evidence may nevertheless be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence, Pa. R. Evid. 403. 

In Commonwealth v. Serge, the Court set forth the conditions which must be met in order for a CGA to be admissible as demonstrative evidence.  

Defendant argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting a computer-generated animation illustrating the Commonwealth's theory of the homicide into evidence. The CGA demonstrated the Commonwealth's argument that defendant tampered with the crime scene to stage a self-defense setting by showing the position of the victim and defendant, and the sequence, path, trajectory, and impact sites of bullets. The state supreme court held that a CGA was potentially admissible as demonstrative evidence, as long as the animation was properly authenticated, it was relevant, and its probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion, as required by Pa. R. Evid. 401, 402, 403, and 901. The state supreme court held that the Commonwealth satisfied all of the foundational requirements for admitting the CGA as demonstrative evidence. Furthermore, the CGA was relevant evidence that enabled the Commonwealth experts to illustrate their opinions and educate the jury on the forensic and physical data. The alleged prejudicial effect of the CGA did not outweigh its relevance. Therefore, the appellate court held that the admission of this evidence was proper.

Under 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1543(a), any person who drives a vehicle on any highway or trafficway of the Commonwealth (including roads in Lehigh County) after a suspension (and before it is restored), can be found guilty of a summary offense and be fined $200.  There are however, enhancement provisions for multiple offenses.  

If the suspension was imposed for a DUI, they can be charged with 75 Pa.C.S.A. 1543(b) where they face a $500 fine and imprisonment of 90 days(!).  A person arrested for driving under suspension pursuant to 1543(b) who at the time of the stop has a BAC greater than or equal to .02% or has illegal drugs in their system faces serious enhancements.  If they have more than one prior 1543(b), they face increased fines and 6 months imprisonment.  It is serious business.  

This even applies who have a suspension subsequent to an ARD admission in Lehigh County.  75 Pa.C.S.A. 3811 authorizes a warrantless arrest of a person if the police officer has probable cause to believe a violation of 1543(b) has occurred, regardless of whether the violation occurred in the officer's presence.  This can happen at a hospital or any other facility as long as the officer has probable cause.  

In addition to jail and fines, a conviction of either 1543(a) or (b) will result in additional license suspensions (normally an additional year).  As any Lehigh County criminal lawyer will tell you, you are playing a risky game where you face jail time if you drive with a suspended license and, if you are caught, you should call a lawyer asap to prepare a defense or get a more favorable resolution.   

As we continue to explore the proof of prior convictions at sentencing, a particular case stands out and is one that a Lehigh County criminal lawyer better know down pat. This is the case of United States v. Robinson. At the sentencing hearing, to the surprise of the prosecutor, Robinson claimed that he was set up by the government. He insisted that he only sold drugs to the undercover informant, and only as a result of the informant's prodding. 

To rebut this contention, a sergeant from the narcotics task force presented hearsay testimony that Robinson sold drugs to at least seven different buyers. The sergeant explained that seven of Robinson's regular customers provided taped sworn statements admitting that they had purchased cocaine from Robinson. Based on their admissions, six of the buyers then pleaded guilty to drug related offenses. Both the Supreme Court and this Court of Appeals have determined that the confrontation clause does not apply in the sentencing context and does not prevent the introduction of hearsay testimony at a sentencing hearing. 

This specifically means that the confrontation clause only applies a trial and not the sentencing. Prosecutors, of course, may not introduce any and all hearsay testimony at a sentencing proceeding. The admission of hearsay statements in the sentencing context is subject to the requirements of the due process clause. Hearsay statements must have some "minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation." The court determined that the evidence offered by the government through the testimony of the sergeant easily passes this test. The court noted that the sergeants testimony was supported by audiotapes of Robinson talking with his buyers and taped sworn statements of those buyers admitting they purchased cocaine for Robinson on multiple occasions. Considering the footprint left by this evidence, the district court's decision to allow the hearsay testimony was warranted.

You may be caught up in a Lehigh County criminal case where you said something out loud and are now charged.  There are freedom of speech issues that your Lehigh County criminal lawyer should know and be ready to defend you on.  Sometimes, this happens with the charge of disorderly conduct.  

In Cohen v. California, the appellee argued that the four-letter expletive imprinted on appellant's jacket was "offensive conduct" that might provoke others to violence against appellant.  His jacket said "Fuck the Draft".  The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, noting that appellant did not engage in any act of violence, or make any loud noises, when he wore the jacket in the municipal courthouse as an expression of his feelings toward the Vietnam War and the draft. A conviction resting solely upon "speech" could be justified under the First and Fourteenth Amendment only for the manner that the freedom was exercised, but not for the content of the message. The Court observed that the statute was not limited to protecting courtroom decorum, nor directed at erotic messages, and the message did not consist of "fighting words," directed at readers of the message. That the message was thrust upon unsuspecting viewers, who were not captive and could avert their eyes, did not entitle appellee to protect the sensitive by curtailing all such speech. Moreover, no evidence demonstrated that anyone was prepared to strike out at whomever assaulted their sensibilities.

But remember, disorderly conduct is constitutional in Pennsylvania.  In Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, after screaming epithets at a meter maid who was performing her official duty, appellant was convicted of disorderly conduct in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5503 and obstructing administration of law or other governmental function in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5101. Appellant sought review of his convictions, alleging that § 5503 was facially invalid on the ground of vagueness, or, in the alternative, was invalid as applied to him. Appellant also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court held that the disorderly conduct statute, § 5503, was not facially invalid for vagueness because a man of common intelligence would understand what was and what was not made criminal under the statute, especially given that the statute could not be used to punish anyone exercising a protected right under U.S. Const. amend. I. The court held that § 5503 was not invalid as applied to appellant because he was not exercising any constitutionally protected right when he loudly hurled epithets, which met the definition of fighting words, at the meter maid. The court affirmed appellant's convictions, holding that the evidence was more than sufficient to sustain them.

What about police and cursing at them?  In 1982, it was not allowed.  In Commonwealth v. Pringle, the case involved in an incident wherein the defendant protested a friend's arrest by repeatedly shouting crude epithets at the arresting officers in front of a large crowd. She was subsequently convicted of disorderly conduct. This case, however, has been repeatedly questioned.  For example, Commonwealth v. Bryner in 1995 is a case that does just so.  In this case, the appellant was convicted of the summary offense of disorderly conduct, under 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503, as the result of his refusal to exit an auction barn following a request to leave and after appellant, in a loud voice, twice told the auction's owner to "go to hell." After considering the Miller test adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for guidance in defining obscenity, the court held that it was clear that the epithet hurled in this case did not, in any way, appeal to anyone's prurient interests. The court therefore found that appellant's speech was not obscene and thus did not violate the disorderly conduct statute. Because appellant's words fell short of that language proscribed in Miller, the court reversed the conviction.

This is the case of Commonwealth v. Smith from 2005, where at sentencing, the Commonwealth offered the following items into evidence: a certified court document from Dauphin County detailing Michael Smith's 1980 conviction in Pennsylvania for which she received a sentence of 1 to 5 years at Camp Hill Prison; a certified court document from Gaston County, North Carolina detailing Michael Smith's 1987 conviction in North Carolina for which you received a 14 year prison sentence; an FBI "rap sheet" from Michael Smith which was received by Lititz police after they submitted defendants fingerprints for identification; and an NCIC "rap sheet" detailing Michael Smith's criminal history. The prosecutor carefully cross-referenced the information set out in each document, which led to the reasonable conclusion that all the documents concern the same person. 

That person of course was the defendant Michael Smith. The defendant drew attention to the fact that some of the FBI fingerprint classification numbers for Michael Smith in the 1980 Pennsylvania conviction were different from some of the FBI fingerprint classification numbers from Michael Smith in the 1987 North Carolina conviction. But although some of the individual classification numbers for each fingerprint varied, the FBI number assigned to defendant was the same for all offenses. Therefore, the court concluded, according to the FBI records the Michael Smith arrested and convicted in this case is the same Michael Smith arrested and convicted in Dauphin County in 1980 and in Gaston County, North Carolina in 1987. 

Further, a number of facts attributed to the Michael Smith with the prior convictions were confirmed through defendant's interaction with police, courts staff and probation department personnel in connection with the present case. These facts include defendant's place of birth, defendant's residence at Camphill prison in 1981, defendant's return to North Carolina at the time the North Carolina crimes were committed and an identifying tattoo on defendant's arm. The court in this case was satisfied with the trial court in that it believed it properly and correctly found the Commonwealth had met its burden of establishing the defendants prior criminal history and convictions and past violent crimes by a preponderance of the evidence. 

Your Lehigh County criminal lawyer must review your "rap sheet" with you.  Your prior criminal history will be provided as part of the Commonwealth's discovery in the case.  

One final note, in a Superior Court case called Commonwealth v. Whisnant from 1990, it was determined that if a defendant contests the accuracy of a record of previous convictions, the court my schedule a hearing where the Commonwealth and the defendant must submit evidence regarding the previous convictions.

There are mandatory minimums relating to the number of marijuana plants for Lehigh County criminal cases.  One case in particular is Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18 (Pa. 1995) which is very important for Lehigh County criminal defense lawyers.  

In this case, the defendant was convicted of growing marijuana plants, but the trial court refused to impose a minimum mandatory sentence pursuant to 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 7508(a)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii), finding the statute unconstitutional. The court found that statutory interpretation was guided by the Statutory Construction Act, 1 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 1901-1991, and that a strong presumption of constitutionality existed. 

The court found that when a statute was clear and unambiguous, it was given its plain meaning. The court held that the statutory language which discussed marijuana plants included the growing of any number of plants. The court found that there was a rational basis for the statute. The court reversed and remanded the case, holding that the statute was constitutional and valid, and there was a rational basis for imposing a minimum mandatory sentence.

The court determined that under a due process/equal protection analysis, it is well established that if a classification does not impermissibly interfere with a fundamental right or disadvantageously affect a suspect class, the classification will be upheld as long as it passes the rational basis test. Since 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 7508 does not implicate a fundamental constitutional right or burden a suspect class, the legislative classification treating growers of marijuana differently from individuals who possess certain quantities of marijuana, must be evaluated under the rational basis analysis. First, the court must determine whether the challenged statute is designed to further a legitimate state interest or public value. If it is, the court must then determine whether the statute is reasonably related to accomplishing the articulated state interest. The court must address whether the statute has some relationship to the interest which the legislature seeks to promote and whether that relationship is reasonable.

Bail in a Lehigh County criminal case is the security required and given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, conditioned upon a written undertaking that the person will appear when required and do all other things stipulated therein. This is from the Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 103. The fundamental purpose of bail in any criminal case is to secure the presence of the accused at trial. In summary cases, bail is termed "collateral", which is defined as the cash or cash equivalent deposited in summary cases. After release on bail following arrest, a defendant assumes the responsibility of being available for any required court appearance upon receipt of reasonable notice and in getting a Lehigh County criminal lawyer. 

The 8th Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, "excessive bail shall not be required." This is a fundamental principle, basic tenant of jurisprudence and applies to the states through the operation of the 14th amendment. Although the 8th Amendment prohibits states from imposing excessive bail, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the amendment does not prohibit the states from denying bail altogether in serious cases. 

The right to bail before trial is guaranteed by Article 1 Section 14 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which provides "all prisoners shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great in addition, the judicial code provides that excessive bail will not be required. However, the right to release on bail before trial is conditioned upon the accused giving adequate assurance that he or she will appear for trial." 

If the court reasonably concludes that a defendant may not appear for trial no matter how high the bail is set, it may not grant bail altogether. For example, if the accused defendant has "jumped bail" in past offense, or if after committing a murder, the accused defendant fled the Commonwealth and was returned to Pennsylvania on a fugitive warrant, bail may be properly denied. Bail may also be denied when the defendant is charged with a capital offense, but only when the court finds "the proof is evident with the presumption great" that a capital offense has been committed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that the constitutional phrase "capital offense" is a definition of a penalty. For the purposes of bail, only murder in the first degree constitutes a capital offense for which the death penalty may be imposed. If the right to bail or the appropriate amount of bail is contested, the burden of proof rests on the Commonwealth to establish that the defendant will not appear for trial or is otherwise not entitled to bail.

18 Pa.C.S. § 2301 defines a deadly weapon as "Any firearm, whether loaded or unloaded, or any device designed as a weapon and capable of producing death or serious bodily injury, or any other device or instrumentality which, in the manner in which it is used or intended to be used, is calculated or likely to produce death or serious bodily injury".  Note that this includes whether the weapon is loaded or unloaded.  It can even be applied if you never carried the weapon but knew that it was being carried by a co-defendant/conspirator.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9712 states, "Except as provided under section 9716 (relating to two or more mandatory minimum sentences applicable), any person who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a crime of violence as defined in section 9714(g) (relating to sentences for second and subsequent offenses), shall, if the person visibly possessed a firearm or a replica of a firearm, whether or not the firearm or replica was loaded or functional, that placed the victim in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury, during the commission of the offense, be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary. Such persons shall not be eligible for parole, probation, work release or furlough."

This is the case of the Commonwealth v. Kimbrough from 2005. In this case, the ruling stated that a judge must state sufficient reasons for a sentence outside the guideline range. These cases definitely require an aggressive Lehigh County criminal lawyer to present significant mitigating circumstances and counter any aggravating circumstances.  Specific preparation with a client will be important to appropriate remorse is express.  

In this case, the defendant was sentenced to 20 years to 40 years on the third degree murder charge, and 10 months to 24 months on each of the reckless endangering charges, all sentences were run consecutively to one another. Thus, the aggregate term of imprisonment is 21 years and eight months to 44 years. The trial court, in the course of imposing sentence, noted that it had the benefit of, and had reviewed, a presentence report. The trial court also noted that it found the defendants assertions of remorse unconvincing and incredible. Furthermore, the trial court determined that the defendant was an extremely poor candidate for rehabilitation. Upon review of the record, the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined that the aggregate sentence of not less than 21 years and eight months and not greater than 44 years imprisonment is not consistent with any specific provision of the Sentencing Code. 

The Superior Court concluded that the trial court properly considered all relevant factors and at the reasons it gave for the sentence imposed were permissible under the law. At sentencing, the trial court referred to the presentence investigation report. The record fully supported the conclusion that the trial court was adequately informed; that it properly considered and enunciated its reasons for the sentences imposed beyond the minimum aggravated range of the guidelines; and that it fashioned an appropriate and reasonable sentence. The Superior Court saw no abuse of discretion and dismissed the defendant's claim to the contrary.

18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 dictates mandatory minimum sentences for drug crimes.  If you are facing a drug crime in Lehigh County, you must know about the potential that you may be facing a mandatory minimum depending on the "weight" or amount of drugs.  These ranges should be discussed with a Lehigh County criminal lawyer.  

In Commonwealth v. Thomas, the defendant delivered 33 Percocet pills to a police informant. The 33 pills had an aggregate weight of 17.4 grams; however, only 330 mg of that weight was the pure narcotic, Oxycodone, the remaining weight was Acetaminophen, binders, and fillers. The standard of review was based on the fact that because convicted drug dealers are not a suspect class and the classification does not involve the exercise of a fundamental or important right, only a minimum level of scrutiny need be applied to determine whether 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508(a)(2) bears a rational relationship to a legitimate legislative objective. 

The pertinent part of the sentencing code that applied to the defendant was,

when the aggregate weight of the compound or mixture containing the substance involved is at least ten grams and less than 100 grams; three years in prison and a fine of $15,000 or such larger amount as is sufficient to exhaust the assets utilized in and the proceeds from the illegal activity; however, if at the time of sentencing the defendant has been convicted of another drug trafficking offense: five years in prison and $30,000 or such larger amount as is sufficient to exhaust the assets utilized in and the proceeds from the illegal activity

 She was was sentenced pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508 to the mandatory minimum sentence of not less than three nor more than six years of incarceration.

The appellate court in 2012 held there was no meaningful difference between the sentencing treatment of pills such as Percocet, Lorcet, and Dilaudid, and LSD, cocaine. Controlled substances were typically sold in a diluted state. In cases where the controlled substance was "cut," the substance was rendered more harmful to society because the dilution increased the potential number of persons who would partake of the proscribed controlled substance. The increased potential for harm to society justified the imposition of more severe penalties for the possession of large amounts of a diluted controlled substance than for smaller amounts of a pure controlled substance. Defendant failed to develop an argument for a constitutional distinction. Thus, a sentencing scheme based upon the aggregate weight of pills containing a controlled substance, including Oxycodone, did not violate either the Federal or Commonwealth Equal Protection Clause.